# ThreatDeck detection pack (sigma) version 2026.11.22-769cef5d # Generated 2026-11-22. 8 queries. # Source: https://threatdeck.net/detections/ . Hunting queries are starting points: tune before alerting. Defensive use only. # ATT&CK ids are MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise v20.1. Adapted rules keep their original licence (see attribution lines). --- # Bedrock model invocation logging configuration deleted # id: llmjacking-bedrock-invocation-logging-deleted | maturity: alert | techniques: AML.T0138, LLM10, AML.T0034 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1685.002 # log source: AWS CloudTrail (management events) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/llmjacking-bedrock-invocation-logging-deleted/ # source: https://sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking/ # source: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html # source: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html title: Amazon Bedrock Model Invocation Logging Deleted id: bc1a9bef-9bd9-43bd-a517-6930b7c2f1af status: experimental description: Detects deletion of the Amazon Bedrock model invocation logging configuration, observed in LLMjacking intrusions to hide prompt activity. references: - https://sysdig.com/blog/growing-dangers-of-llmjacking/ - https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/model-invocation-logging.html author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685.002 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: 'bedrock.amazonaws.com' eventName: 'DeleteModelInvocationLoggingConfiguration' condition: selection falsepositives: - Planned decommissioning or reconfiguration of Bedrock logging by the platform team level: high --- # AI coding agent CLI started with an approval-bypass flag # id: ai-cli-approval-bypass-flag | maturity: hunt | techniques: ASI02, LLM06, AML.T0053, ASI05 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1059 # log source: Process creation (EDR / Sysmon for Linux / macOS Endpoint Security) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/ai-cli-approval-bypass-flag/ # source: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes # source: https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/developer-commands?surface=cli # source: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md # source: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/supply-chain-security-alert-popular-nx-build-system-package-compromised-with-data-stealing-malware # source: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/defense_evasion_genai_cli_unsafe_permission_bypass.toml title: AI Coding Agent CLI Started With Approval Bypass Flag id: ad765f0f-d0dc-4c0c-929f-05005c389d2a status: experimental description: Detects AI coding agent CLIs launched with flags that auto-approve every tool call or disable the sandbox. references: - https://code.claude.com/docs/en/permission-modes - https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/developer-commands?surface=cli - https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/supply-chain-security-alert-popular-nx-build-system-package-compromised-with-data-stealing-malware author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.execution - attack.t1059 - detection.threat-hunting logsource: category: process_creation detection: selection_flags: CommandLine|contains: - '--dangerously-skip-permissions' - 'bypassPermissions' - '--yolo' - '--approval-mode=yolo' - '--approval-mode yolo' - '--trust-all-tools' - '--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandbox' selection_tools: CommandLine|contains: - 'claude' - 'gemini' - 'codex' - 'q chat' filter_optional_ci_runners: # GitHub Actions, GitLab, Buildkite and Azure Pipelines agents: bypass mode in CI is expected ParentImage|endswith: - '/Runner.Worker' - '\Runner.Worker.exe' - '/gitlab-runner' - '\gitlab-runner.exe' - '/buildkite-agent' - '/Agent.Worker' - '\Agent.Worker.exe' filter_optional_containers: # Devcontainers and sandboxes started through a container runtime shim ParentImage|endswith: - '/containerd-shim-runc-v2' - '/docker-init' condition: all of selection_* and not 1 of filter_optional_* falsepositives: - Developers who use bypass modes interactively on their workstations (expect one hit per such developer per session; treat as an inventory and policy review, not an alert) - Agents run in disposable VMs or containers whose parent is not one of the filtered runner or shim processes - Wrapper scripts and IDE integrations that start agents in bypass mode level: low --- # AI coding agent spawns a shell that pipes a download into an interpreter # id: ai-agent-download-and-execute | maturity: hunt | techniques: ASI05, LLM01, AML.T0051, AML.T0050 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1105, T1059.004, T1698 # log source: Process creation on Linux and macOS (EDR / Sysmon for Linux / Endpoint Security) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/ai-agent-download-and-execute/ # source: https://specterops.io/blog/2025/11/21/an-evening-with-claude-code/ # source: https://github.com/elastic/detection-rules/blob/main/rules/cross-platform/execution_prompt_injection_coercing_shell_execution.toml # source: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/claude-directory title: AI Coding Agent Spawns Download-And-Execute Shell id: da92b961-a478-451c-a3cd-b10eac16cb3f status: experimental description: Detects a shell started by an AI coding agent that downloads content with curl or wget and pipes it into an interpreter. references: - https://specterops.io/blog/2025/11/21/an-evening-with-claude-code/ - https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/ author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.command-and-control - attack.t1105 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.004 - attack.t1698 - detection.threat-hunting logsource: category: process_creation detection: selection_parent: - ParentImage|endswith: - '/claude' - '/codex' - '/cursor-agent' - '/gemini' - ParentImage|contains: '/.local/share/claude/versions/' - ParentCommandLine|contains: - '@anthropic-ai/claude-code' - '@google/gemini-cli' - '@openai/codex' selection_shell: Image|endswith: - '/sh' - '/bash' - '/zsh' - '/dash' selection_download: CommandLine|contains: - 'curl ' - 'wget ' selection_exec: CommandLine|contains: - '| sh' - '|sh' - '| bash' - '|bash' - '| zsh' - '| python' - '|python' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Agents following official install instructions that use curl-pipe-shell installers (for example language toolchains) level: medium --- # AI tool MCP configuration file modified by an unexpected process (Sigma, macOS/Linux) # id: mcp-config-modified-sigma | maturity: hunt | techniques: AML.T0081, ASI04, AML.T0110 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1546 # log source: File events on macOS / Linux (EDR file_event) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/mcp-config-modified-sigma/ # source: https://socket.dev/blog/sandworm-mode-npm-worm-ai-toolchain-poisoning # source: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp # source: https://cursor.com/docs/context/mcp # source: https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/develop/connect-local-servers # source: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/reference/configuration.md title: AI Tool MCP Configuration Modified By Unexpected Process id: 33344c56-0b85-49d9-8701-ee372a7f5773 status: experimental description: Detects writes to AI coding tool MCP configuration files by processes other than the tools themselves, as used by the SANDWORM_MODE npm worm to inject a rogue MCP server. references: - https://socket.dev/blog/sandworm-mode-npm-worm-ai-toolchain-poisoning - https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp - https://cursor.com/docs/context/mcp - https://modelcontextprotocol.io/docs/develop/connect-local-servers author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1546 - detection.threat-hunting logsource: category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - '/.claude.json' - '/.mcp.json' - '/.claude/settings.json' - '/.cursor/mcp.json' - '/Claude/claude_desktop_config.json' - '/.continue/config.json' - '/.windsurf/mcp.json' - '/mcp_config.json' - '/.gemini/settings.json' - '/.codex/config.toml' filter_main_tools: - Image|endswith: - '/claude' - '/codex' - '/gemini' - '/cursor-agent' - Image|contains: - '/.local/share/claude/versions/' - '/Claude.app/' - '/Cursor.app/' - '/Windsurf.app/' - '/Visual Studio Code.app/' condition: selection and not filter_main_tools falsepositives: - git checkouts of repositories that contain .mcp.json or .claude/settings.json - Configuration management or dotfile tooling deploying approved MCP servers level: medium --- # Claude Code / VS Code project persistence files from the Mini Shai-Hulud worm # id: claude-code-hook-persistence-mini-shai-hulud | maturity: alert | techniques: AML.T0142, AML.T0081, ASI04, LLM03 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1546, T1195.002, T1059.007 # log source: File events (EDR file_event on Linux, macOS or Windows) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/claude-code-hook-persistence-mini-shai-hulud/ # source: https://socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack # source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Malware/TanStack-Supply-Chain/file_event_lnx_malware_tanstack_supply_chain.yml # source: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks # File indicators overlap SigmaHQ rule 2b5e4d3f-7c9a-4fab-a8d1-3e6f5a7b8c9d by Leonardo Gasparini (Detection Rule License 1.1); rule logic written independently title: Mini Shai-Hulud Claude Code And VS Code Project Persistence Files id: 6d1de01f-3cdc-49fd-9d71-899775210dd7 status: experimental description: Detects creation of the self-copy and loader files the Mini Shai-Hulud worm writes into .claude and .vscode project folders to persist through Claude Code hooks and VS Code tasks. references: - https://socket.dev/blog/tanstack-npm-packages-compromised-mini-shai-hulud-supply-chain-attack - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules-emerging-threats/2026/Malware/TanStack-Supply-Chain/file_event_lnx_malware_tanstack_supply_chain.yml - https://code.claude.com/docs/en/hooks author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1546 - attack.initial-access - attack.t1195.002 - attack.execution - attack.t1059.007 logsource: category: file_event detection: selection: TargetFilename|endswith: - '/.claude/router_runtime.js' - '/.claude/setup.mjs' - '/.vscode/setup.mjs' - '\.claude\router_runtime.js' - '\.claude\setup.mjs' - '\.vscode\setup.mjs' condition: selection falsepositives: - Projects that legitimately ship a .vscode/setup.mjs helper (rare) level: high --- # New MCP server registered through an agent CLI (claude / codex / gemini mcp add) # id: mcp-server-registered-via-agent-cli | maturity: hunt | techniques: ASI04, AML.T0081, LLM03 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1546 # log source: Process creation (EDR / Sysmon / macOS Endpoint Security) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/mcp-server-registered-via-agent-cli/ # source: https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp # source: https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/developer-commands?surface=cli # source: https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/tools/mcp-server.md title: MCP Server Registered Via AI Agent CLI id: 31608b94-77a2-4d5e-8287-f5db62fa5888 status: experimental description: Detects registration of a new MCP server through the Claude Code, Codex or Gemini CLI. references: - https://code.claude.com/docs/en/mcp - https://learn.chatgpt.com/docs/developer-commands?surface=cli - https://github.com/google-gemini/gemini-cli/blob/main/docs/tools/mcp-server.md author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.persistence - attack.t1546 - detection.threat-hunting logsource: category: process_creation detection: selection_tool: CommandLine|contains: - 'claude' - 'codex' - 'gemini' selection_add: CommandLine|contains: ' mcp add' condition: all of selection_* falsepositives: - Developers adding approved MCP servers - Onboarding scripts that register the organization's standard servers level: low --- # Bedrock guardrail deleted or updated # id: bedrock-guardrail-deleted-or-updated | maturity: hunt | techniques: AML.T0054, LLM01 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1685 # log source: AWS CloudTrail (management events) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/bedrock-guardrail-deleted-or-updated/ # source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_cloudtrail_bedrock_guardrail_deleted.yml # source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_cloudtrail_bedrock_guardrail_updated.yml # source: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/bedrock/latest/userguide/logging-using-cloudtrail.html # Adapted from SigmaHQ rules 59b70e4d-dd17-44a9-b740-acf07ae3eb6a and 1c722651-254a-4b04-a9f4-99b62a2d0a1f (Detection Rule License 1.1) title: Amazon Bedrock Guardrail Deleted Or Updated id: 19a690c0-07a7-4d81-ae92-ad1f0d84a32d status: experimental description: Detects deletion or update of an Amazon Bedrock guardrail, which can weaken model safety and prompt-attack filtering. references: - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_cloudtrail_bedrock_guardrail_deleted.yml - https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/cloud/aws/cloudtrail/aws_cloudtrail_bedrock_guardrail_updated.yml author: ThreatDeck (adapted from SigmaHQ rules by Marco Pedrinazzi) date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.defense-impairment - attack.t1685 logsource: product: aws service: cloudtrail detection: selection: eventSource: 'bedrock.amazonaws.com' eventName: - 'DeleteGuardrail' - 'UpdateGuardrail' condition: selection falsepositives: - Planned guardrail changes by authorized identities level: medium --- # Web proxy: requests to AI model APIs that do not come from the approved AI gateway # id: proxy-ai-api-requests-bypassing-gateway | maturity: hunt | techniques: LLM02, AML.T0096 # MITRE ATT&CK: T1567 # log source: Web proxy logs (Sigma proxy category) # page: https://threatdeck.net/detections/proxy-ai-api-requests-bypassing-gateway/ # source: https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/overview # source: https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/overview # source: https://aistudio.google.com/api-reference # source: https://api-docs.deepseek.com/ # source: https://openrouter.ai/docs/quickstart # source: https://huggingface.co/docs/inference-providers/index # source: https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/openai/reference title: AI Model API Request Not From Approved Gateway id: 634cab20-7a79-41db-a7f3-f55675fb6f1f status: experimental description: Detects POST requests to public AI model APIs from sources other than the approved AI gateway. references: - https://platform.claude.com/docs/en/api/overview - https://developers.openai.com/api/reference/overview - https://aistudio.google.com/api-reference - https://learn.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/ai-foundry/openai/reference author: ThreatDeck date: 2026-11-09 modified: 2026-11-10 tags: - attack.exfiltration - attack.t1567 - detection.threat-hunting logsource: category: proxy detection: selection_method: cs-method: 'POST' selection_host: - cs-host: - 'api.openai.com' - 'api.anthropic.com' - 'generativelanguage.googleapis.com' - 'api.deepseek.com' - 'openrouter.ai' - 'router.huggingface.co' - cs-host|endswith: '.openai.azure.com' filter_main_gateway: src_ip|cidr: '192.0.2.0/24' # replace with the AI gateway egress range condition: all of selection_* and not filter_main_gateway falsepositives: - Approved applications that call providers directly level: low