AI Stack Alert High CVE-2026-62264 For AppSec, AI Eng, SOC / IR AI-assisted
CVE-2026-62264: PDF Reader MCP HTTP mode skips X-API-Key validation
In @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp versions 2.2.0 through 3.0.0, the HTTP transport (MCP_TRANSPORT=http) logs that X-API-Key authentication is enabled but never checks the header. The /mcp endpoint therefore accepts unauthenticated clients. The issue is fixed in 3.0.1; the default stdio transport is unaffected.
Why it matters
With the default bind address 0.0.0.0, any host that can reach the port can call every PDF tool and read any PDF the server process can open. The startup log falsely suggests authentication is active, which may delay detection.
Do this
- Upgrade @sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp to 3.0.1 or later.
- Until patched, do not run with MCP_TRANSPORT=http on reachable networks. Use the default stdio transport or bind to loopback behind an authenticating proxy.
- Restrict network access to the MCP HTTP port with host firewall or security group rules.
- Inventory hosts running this package and check for MCP_TRANSPORT=http and listening ports.
- Review HTTP access logs for requests to /mcp from unexpected sources, and keep --allow-private-ips disabled to limit SSRF.
Exploit Clock
Exploitation unlikely (for now)
- EPSS 0.45%
Signals
- NoCISA KEV
- 7.5CVSS
- 0.45%EPSS
- NoPublic PoC
- 36/100Priority
- 80%Confidence
Evidence
“reads `MCP_API_KEY` and logs that `X-API-Key` authentication is enabled but never validates the `X-API-Key` header on incoming requests”
“any client able to reach the port can invoke every PDF tool and read any PDF the server process can open on the host”
“The default `stdio` transport is unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1.”
Sources
Affected / related
@sylphx/pdf-reader-mcp, PDF Reader MCP
Published 2026-10-30 19:18 UTC · updated 2026-11-08 02:31 UTC · AI-assisted summary, checked against quoted sources · How we score