New Technique Medium TD-2026-0049 For CISO, AppSec, Red Team AI-assisted
Google DeepMind AI agents find cheaper attacks on 1024-bit RSA signatures and factoring
Google DeepMind, working with cryptographers from UC San Diego and Inria, reports that AI agents found ways to lower the cost of attacking 1024-bit RSA. One finding applies to PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures, the format used by the PKCS#11 interface of HSMs, when the attacker controls about half the signed block or more. The agents also proposed a multi-key factoring method that is theoretical and has not been implemented.
Why it matters
Organizations still using 1024-bit RSA keys for signing, including through HSMs, may face forgery at lower cost than previously assumed. The source says the signature attack does not recover the private key and needs about 4 billion signing queries in advance.
Do this
- Inventory RSA keys and certificates, and identify any 1024-bit keys used for signing or encryption.
- Plan migration of legacy 1024-bit RSA to 2048-bit or larger keys, as the source indicates modern protocols use these sizes.
- Review HSM and PKCS#11 signing workflows that use PKCS#1 v1.5 where an external party can influence the signed content.
- Confirm whether devices hash messages internally, since the source says the signature attack does not work against such devices.
- Track the full DeepMind paper and any independent implementation or review of the factoring method before changing risk ratings.
Signals
- NoCISA KEV
- 23/100Priority
- 60%Confidence
Evidence
“In practice, these results only affect obsolete 1024-bit RSA systems, and modern encryption protocols, which almost universally use 2048-bit or larger keys, remain secure,”
“Once they control roughly half of the block or more, padding adds no protection at all,”
“The key was not factored; that would take an estimated 500,000 to 1 million core-years.”
“The researchers noted that the signature attack does not recover the private key.”
Sources
Affected / related
Google DeepMind, RSA-1024 signature forgery (PKCS#1 v1.5), Shared-cost multi-key RSA factoring, PKCS#11 signing interface
Published 2026-11-09 08:35 UTC · updated 2026-11-09 14:35 UTC · AI-assisted summary, checked against quoted sources · How we score