CloudTrail Lake SQLAlert-ready after reviewCloud AI abuse: Amazon Bedrock (LLMjacking)
Bedrock model-access enablement APIs called with a long-term access key
Attackers holding stolen IAM user keys enable models themselves: they submit a use-case form (PutUseCaseForModelAccess), create an agreement (CreateFoundationModelAgreement) and request the entitlement (PutFoundationModelEntitlement). Permiso notes these are normally driven by the console, so calls made with a long-term key (AKIA…) are rare in legitimate use.
- Log source
- AWS CloudTrail Lake event data store (management events)
- Techniques
- LLM10 Unbounded Consumption · AML.T0034 Cost Harvesting · AML.T0012 Valid Accounts · AML.T0040 AI Model Inference API Access
- MITRE ATT&CK
- T1078.004Cloud AccountsT1496.004Cloud Service Hijacking
- Reviewed
- 2026-11-10
Query · CloudTrail Lake SQL
SELECT eventTime, eventName, awsRegion, sourceIPAddress, userAgent, errorCode,
userIdentity.arn AS principal, userIdentity.accessKeyId AS access_key_id
FROM $EDS_ID
WHERE eventSource = 'bedrock.amazonaws.com'
AND eventName IN ('GetFoundationModelAvailability', 'PutUseCaseForModelAccess', 'GetUseCaseForModelAccess',
'CreateFoundationModelAgreement', 'PutFoundationModelEntitlement', 'ListFoundationModelAgreementOffers')
AND userIdentity.accessKeyId LIKE 'AKIA%'
AND eventTime > date_add('day', -30, now())
ORDER BY eventTime DESC Other platforms
Microsoft Sentinel / Defender (KQL)
Microsoft Sentinel / Log Analytics: AWSCloudTrail (Amazon Web Services S3 connector)
let access_apis = dynamic(["GetFoundationModelAvailability", "PutUseCaseForModelAccess", "GetUseCaseForModelAccess",
"CreateFoundationModelAgreement", "PutFoundationModelEntitlement", "ListFoundationModelAgreementOffers"]);
AWSCloudTrail
| where TimeGenerated > ago(1d)
| where EventSource == "bedrock.amazonaws.com"
| where EventName in (access_apis)
| where UserIdentityAccessKeyId startswith "AKIA"
| project TimeGenerated, EventName, AWSRegion, SourceIpAddress, UserAgent, ErrorCode,
UserIdentityArn, UserIdentityAccessKeyId, RecipientAccountId
| order by TimeGenerated desc Splunk (SPL)
Splunk: AWS CloudTrail (Splunk Add-on for AWS, sourcetype aws:cloudtrail) · Set index= to the index that holds your CloudTrail data.
index=aws sourcetype=aws:cloudtrail eventSource="bedrock.amazonaws.com"
eventName IN ("GetFoundationModelAvailability", "PutUseCaseForModelAccess", "GetUseCaseForModelAccess",
"CreateFoundationModelAgreement", "PutFoundationModelEntitlement", "ListFoundationModelAgreementOffers")
userIdentity.accessKeyId="AKIA*"
| table _time eventName awsRegion sourceIPAddress userAgent errorCode userIdentity.arn userIdentity.accessKeyId recipientAccountId
| sort - _time Expected false positives
- Infrastructure-as-code or scripts that enable Bedrock model access with an IAM user key
- Break-glass IAM users used by administrators from the CLI
Sources
- Permiso: Exploiting hosted models — LLMjacking on Amazon Bedrock (Oct 2024)
- Sysdig: The growing dangers of LLMjacking (Sep 2024)
- AWS docs: Monitor Amazon Bedrock API calls using CloudTrail
- AWS docs: CloudTrail Lake SQL constraints (Trino SQL)
Reviewed against vendor documentation, not tested in your environment. Defensive use only.