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Get visibility into Shadow AI

Employees use chat assistants, browser extensions, AI features inside SaaS apps and personal accounts for work data. Leadership asks what is being used and what data goes where. Many products promise discovery; practitioners point out that discovery without enforcement is just inventory.

What practitioners converge on

  1. Start from existing telemetry. Proxy/SWG logs, DNS, CASB, browser management and OAuth grant logs usually show most AI usage before any new tool is bought.
  2. Sanction a good default. Give staff an approved assistant with enterprise data terms; usage of unapproved tools drops when a usable sanctioned option exists.
  3. Control the data, not just the domain. Prompt and upload inspection (DLP for GenAI) matters more than domain lists, because AI features appear inside apps you already allow.
  4. Watch OAuth and extensions. AI browser extensions and OAuth-connected AI apps get standing access to mail, files and pages. Review them like software installs.

Checklist

7 steps
  • LLM02

Saved in this browser. Track technique-level testing per system in Coverage.

Open-source stack

Also on the radar for these techniques: AgentZ, Weir

If you are evaluating vendors

AI usage control (Shadow AI, GenAI DLP)

  • Is this enforcement or only discovery? Show a prompt with a secret being blocked or redacted inline, not an alert afterwards.
  • Which surfaces are covered today: web apps, desktop apps, IDE plugins, CLIs, agentic browsers, embedded AI inside SaaS?
  • How do you handle personal accounts on sanctioned tools (personal ChatGPT vs the enterprise tenant)?
  • What is the false-positive rate on our own prompts and files during the POC, and who tunes the classifiers?

AI-SPM, AI-BOM and model supply chain

  • What does the AI-BOM include: models, datasets, AI services, agents, MCP servers, prompts?
  • Which model formats are scanned (pickle, safetensors, GGUF, ONNX…), and are findings explained or just flagged?
  • How are findings prioritised: exposure and data access paths, or a flat list of misconfigurations?
  • Does it cover self-hosted models and GPU workloads, not only managed AI services?

Full vendor landscape and POC questions

Detect and hunt 6

Techniques

References

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Reviewed 2026-11-09 · tools and news update automatically

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