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Claude Code

Anthropic · CLI agent · homepage · anthropics/claude-code

2.1.330latest (2026-11-20)
2.1.251minimum safe version
32advisories for Claude Code

Minimum safe version is set by CVE-2026-88968 (TOCTOU Race in Edit Tool Allows File Writes Outside the Workspace, fixed in 2.1.251): the highest fix among Claude Code's medium-or-higher advisories. Only advisories for Claude Code itself are counted; other components and ecosystem projects are listed separately below.

Advisories

IDTitleSeverityFixed inPublished
CVE-2026-88968 TOCTOU Race in Edit Tool Allows File Writes Outside the Workspace · sets minimum safe version High 2.1.251 2026-10-26
CVE-2026-86063 Plugin Commit SHA Pin Bypass Allows Installation of Attacker-Controlled Code High 2.1.179 2026-10-09
CVE-2026-103435 Arbitrary File Write via Write-Time Symlink Following (TOCTOU) in Claude Code High 2.1.129 2026-10-05
CVE-2026-103012 Managed Settings Not Applied When a Stored API Key Was Preferred Over Enterprise Sign-In Low 2.1.260 2026-09-29
CVE-2026-46406 Insecure Temporary File in /copy Command Enables Response Disclosure and Symlink-Based File Write Medium 2.1.128 2026-06-25
CVE-2026-55607 Sandbox Escape via Git Worktree Path Confusion Allows Unsandboxed Code Execution High 2.1.163 2026-06-25
CVE-2026-54316 Out-of-Band Data Exfiltration via Pre-Approved HuggingFace Domain in WebFetch Medium 2.1.163 2026-06-13
CVE-2026-40068 Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution High 2.1.84 2026-04-24
CVE-2026-39861 Sandbox Escape via Symlink Following Allows Arbitrary File Write Outside Workspace High 2.1.64 2026-04-20
CVE-2026-35603 Insecure System-Wide Configuration Loading Enables Local Privilege Escalation on Windows Medium 2.1.75 2026-04-17
Show 22 older advisories
IDTitleSeverityFixed inPublished
CVE-2026-33068 Workspace Trust Dialog Bypass via Repo-Controlled Settings File High 2.1.53 2026-03-18
CVE-2026-25722 Command Injection via Directory Change Bypasses Write Protection High 2.0.57 2026-02-06
CVE-2026-25723 Command Injection via Piped sed Command Bypasses File Write Restrictions High 2.0.55 2026-02-06
CVE-2026-25725 Sandbox Escape via Persistent Configuration Injection in settings.json High 2.1.2 2026-02-06
CVE-2026-25724 Permission Deny Bypass Through Symbolic Links Low 2.1.7 2026-02-06
CVE-2026-24887 Command Injection in find Command Bypasses User Approval Prompt High 2.0.72 2026-02-03
CVE-2026-24053 Path Restriction Bypass via ZSH Clobber Allows Arbitrary File Writes High 2.0.74 2026-02-03
CVE-2026-24052 Domain Validation Bypass Allows Automatic Requests to Attacker-Controlled Domains High 1.0.111 2026-02-03
CVE-2026-21852 Malicious repo configuration can trigger data leakage via environment configuration used before trust confirmation Medium 2.0.65 2026-01-20
CVE-2025-66032 Command Validation Bypass Allows Arbitrary Code Execution High 1.0.93 2025-12-03
CVE-2025-64755 Sed Command Validation Bypass Allows Arbitrary File Writes High 2.0.31 2025-11-20
CVE-2025-65099 Command execution prior to Claude Code startup trust dialog High 1.0.39 2025-11-19
CVE-2025-59536 Command execution prior to Claude Code startup trust dialog High 1.0.111 2025-10-03
CVE-2025-59829 Permission deny bypass through symlink Low 1.0.120 2025-10-03
CVE-2025-59828 Claude Code Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution via Plugin Autoloading with Specific Yarn Versions High 1.0.39 2025-09-24
CVE-2025-58764 Command Injection in Claude Code rg command allowed bypass of user approval prompt for command execution High 1.0.105 2025-09-09
CVE-2025-59041 Claude Code vulnerable to arbitrary code execution caused by maliciously configured git email High 1.0.105 2025-09-09
GHSA-ph6w-f82w-28w6 Claude Code Vulnerable to Arbitrary Code Execution Due to Insufficient Startup Warning High 1.0.87 2025-09-02
CVE-2025-55284 Permissive Default Allowlist Enables Unauthorized File Read and Network Exfiltration in Claude Code High 1.0.4 2025-08-15
CVE-2025-54794 Path Restriction Bypass in Claude Code Research Preview could allow unauthorized file access when path prefixes collide High 0.2.111 2025-08-01
CVE-2025-54795 Command Injection in Claude Code echo command allowed bypass of user approval prompt for command execution High 1.0.20 2025-08-01
CVE-2025-52882 Claude Code IDE extensions allow websocket connections from arbitrary origins High 1.0.24 2025-06-23

Advisories for other Anthropic components or third-party projects that build on Claude Code. Not counted above and not used for the minimum safe version.

IDComponentTitleSeverityFixed inPublished
CVE-2026-77390 pmo-platform pmo-platform is a modular PMO and release-management platform for Claude Code. Prior to 3.73, release/skills/pmo-skill-refiner/eval-viewer/g… Medium — 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-77389 pmo-platform pmo-platform is a modular PMO and release-management platform for Claude Code. Prior to 3.73, core/hooks/block-fragile-refs.sh and core/hook… Low — 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-77350 pmo-platform pmo-platform is a modular PMO and release-management platform for Claude Code. Prior to 3.69.1, core/hooks/block-credential-reads.sh, core/h… High — 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-77349 pmo-platform pmo-platform is a modular PMO and release-management platform for Claude Code. From 3.48 until 3.69.1, release/skills/pmo-skill-refiner/eval… Medium — 2026-11-20
CVE-2026-75612 yt-mcp yt-mcp is a YouTrack MCP server for Claude Code. Prior to 1.18.1, add_attachment in src/yt_mcp/tools/attachments.py accepts a caller-control… High — 2026-11-18
CVE-2026-62331 praktor praktor is a multi-agent Claude Code orchestrator with Telegram input and output, Docker isolation, and a Mission Control UI. Prior to 0.9.1… High — 2026-10-30
CVE-2026-96620 Claude Agent SDK Claude Agent SDK is a Python SDK for Claude Code. Prior to 0.2.121, the resume option is passed to the Claude CLI as a separate token withou… Critical — 2026-10-16
CVE-2026-88066 Claude Desktop Uncontrolled Search Path Enables Arbitrary Code Execution via Malicious Git Executable High 1.8089.0 2026-10-13
CVE-2026-100585 OpenClaw OpenClaw (npm package `openclaw`) before 2026.7.1 fails to enforce the owner-only authorization requirement for Claude Code permission promp… High — 2026-09-26
GHSA-v234-4jrq-mgg6 Claude Desktop Claude Desktop (macOS): opening a malicious file from a Cowork folder could run commands on the host High 1.15962.0 2026-09-25
CVE-2026-49986 Cortex MCP server The Cortex MCP server (`neuro-cortex-memory`), a cross-platform persistent memory MCP, prior to version 3.17.1 treats the `CLAUDE_PROJECT_DI… High — 2026-08-14
CVE-2026-73614 Network-AI ClaudeHookBridge Network-AI ClaudeHookBridge before 5.15.1 truncates the target string to 500 characters before evaluating denyPatterns, while Claude Code ex… High — 2026-08-13
CVE-2026-73222 Claude Code Templates Claude Code Templates is a CLI tool for configuring and monitoring Claude Code. Prior to 1.29.4, the Claude Code Studio server launched by t… High — 2026-08-11
CVE-2026-57495 AgenticMail AgenticMail gives AI agents real email addresses and phone numbers. In @agenticmail/claudecode prior to version 0.2.39, @agenticmail/codex p… High — 2026-07-20
CVE-2026-47751 Claude Code Action Claude Code Action is a general-purpose GitHub action that runs Claude Code on GitHub pull requests and issues. Prior to 1.0.74, because the… Medium — 2026-07-16
CVE-2026-44467 Claude Desktop SSH Host Key Verification Bypass Allows Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Remote Sessions High 1.4304.0 2026-05-06
CVE-2026-44470 Claude Desktop Local Privilege Escalation via Directory Junction in CoworkVMService High 1.3834.0 2026-05-06

Hardening checklist

  • Keep auto-update enabled and verify the installed version against the minimum safe version.
  • Do not open untrusted repositories with agent mode or auto-approve enabled.
  • Restrict MCP servers to an allowlist; review each server's permissions and publisher.
  • Never place secrets in project files the agent can read; use a secrets manager or env injection.
  • Review .claude/settings.json permission rules in every cloned repo before trusting it.

Data exposure

What Claude Code keeps on a developer machine, what it sends, and the settings that reduce exposure. Local transcripts can contain anything pasted into a session, including secrets: include these paths in secret scanning and offboarding.

Stored locally

WhatWhere
Session transcripts in plaintext JSONL: messages, tool calls and tool results (file contents, command output, pasted text), plus the system prompt and loaded instruction files.~/.claude/projects/<project>/<session>.jsonl (subagent transcripts and large tool outputs in ~/.claude/projects/<project>/<session>/)
Prompt history you typed, with timestamp and project path. Not removed by the age-based cleanup.~/.claude/history.jsonl
Pre-edit snapshots of files Claude changed (checkpoint restore).~/.claude/file-history/<session>/
Contents of large pastes.~/.claude/paste-cache/
Per-session debug logs, only while debug logging is on.~/.claude/debug/
Login credentials.macOS Keychain (falls back to ~/.claude/.credentials.json, mode 0600, if the Keychain rejects the write); Linux ~/.claude/.credentials.json (0600); Windows %USERPROFILE%\.claude\.credentials.json

Sent to the vendor

All prompts and model outputs go to the model provider over TLS 1.2+. Usage metrics exclude code, prompts and file paths; error reports are redacted. /feedback, /bug and /share send conversation history including code. WebFetch sends the requested hostname (not the URL) to api.anthropic.com for a safety check.

Retention and training

Consumer plans: 5 years if model-improvement is allowed, otherwise 30 days. Team, Enterprise and API: 30 days and no training on Claude Code data by default; zero data retention is available to qualified Enterprise accounts. /feedback transcripts are kept 5 years.

Settings that reduce exposure

cleanupPeriodDays
Sets how many days local transcripts and related session files are kept (default 30, minimum 1).
CLAUDE_CODE_SKIP_PROMPT_HISTORY=1
Skips writing transcripts and prompt history to disk; such sessions cannot be resumed.
--no-session-persistence (with -p)
Non-interactive runs do not persist the session transcript.
permissions.deny rules such as Read(./.env)
Blocks reads of credential files so their contents never enter a transcript.
claude purge <path>
Deletes one project's transcripts, memory, file history and matching history.jsonl lines after confirmation.
DISABLE_TELEMETRY=1 / DISABLE_ERROR_REPORTING=1
Turns off usage metrics / error reports.
DISABLE_FEEDBACK_COMMAND=1
Disables /feedback, which uploads conversation history.
CLAUDE_CODE_DISABLE_NONESSENTIAL_TRAFFIC
Disables all non-essential traffic at once (metrics, error reports, surveys); does not affect the WebFetch check.

For administrators

  • Managed settings file: /Library/Application Support/ClaudeCode/managed-settings.json (macOS), /etc/claude-code/managed-settings.json (Linux/WSL), C:\Program Files\ClaudeCode\managed-settings.json (Windows), or MDM / server-managed settings.
  • A managed cleanupPeriodDays enforces the local transcript retention period on every machine; the retention_sweep OpenTelemetry event reports whether the sweep ran.
  • forceLoginMethod and forceLoginOrgUUID restrict sign-in to the organization's accounts.
  • allowManagedPermissionRulesOnly, allowManagedMcpServersOnly and allowManagedHooksOnly make managed policy the only source of permission rules, MCP servers and hooks.
  • OpenTelemetry export redacts prompt text and tool details by default; OTEL_LOG_USER_PROMPTS and OTEL_LOG_TOOL_DETAILS must be set to include them.

Sources: Claude Code docs: Data usage · Claude Code docs: The .claude directory (application data) · Claude Code docs: Identity and access management (credential storage) · Claude Code docs: Managed settings · Claude Code docs: Settings (permission rules) · Claude Code docs: Environment variables · Claude Code docs: Monitoring (OpenTelemetry) · reviewed 2026-11-09

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Updated 2026-11-22

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